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This paper investigates the UK wage curve using longitudinal micro data 
drawn from the first eight waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). We estimate a fixed-effects model that controls for observed and 
unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity. Our results suggest that there 
is evidence of a negative relationship in wage-unemployment space. The 
estimated unemployment elasticity of pay for UK males is approximately 
-0.14 and this elasticity is robust to a number of alternative specifications.  
There is no evidence of a significant wage curve for women. These findings 
are consistent with panel studies reported for other countries. They contrast 
with previous studies for the UK, however, in that they reject the inclusion 
of higher order polynomial terms for unemployment. The main findings of 
the paper, therefore, are that the wage-unemployment relationship is robust 
but not as non-linear as has been previously thought. 
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THE UK WAGE CURVE: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE 
BRITISH HOUSEHOLD PANEL SURVEY 
 
I. Introduction 
Recent contributions to the literature by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994a, 1994b, 
1995) adhere to the existence of a new empirical law of economics, a stable inverse non-linear 
relationship between individual pay and the local unemployment rate.  They name this new 
regularity the ‘Wage Curve’.  The empirical foundation of this relationship is a Mincerian 
earnings equation augmented with the unemployment rate for an individual’s local labour 
market.  The local unemployment rate provides a measure for the degree of joblessness in the 
local market.  The purpose of such equations is thus to examine the role of local 
unemployment in the determination of local pay, “where causality is to be thought of as 
running from the amount of joblessness to the level of wages”.1 
 
Evidence for the existence of a wage curve appears irrefutable.  Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994b) present evidence utilising information on approximately three and a half million 
people from a dozen countries.  Additional papers utilising datasets from countries as diverse 
as Belgium, Norway, South Africa and the Ivory Coast extend the result further.  The 
relationship appears virtually identical across a variety of countries, regardless of institutional 
and industry structure.  Results for the US, Britain, South Korea, Canada and a number of 
other Western European Countries suggest that the unemployment elasticity of pay is -0.1, 
that is, a 10% increase in local unemployment results in a 1% decrease in local pay.  Such 
uniformity in wage flexibility appears remarkable, particularly in Europe where differences in 
                                                          
 
1 Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b), p.3. 
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international wage setting behaviour are frequently cited as a potential explanation of aggregate 
unemployment.2 It is not, however, without criticism.  Card (1995), in a searching review of 
the Wage Curve, accepts Blanchflower and Oswald’s conclusion of a negative correlation 
between wages and the local unemployment rate.  The origin and interpretation of this 
correlation remains, however, a source for debate. 
 
Critiques of Blanchflower and Oswald emphasise issues concerning choice of econometric 
technique.  Model specification, sample selection, lagged dependent variables, and 
endogeneity between unemployment and wages have all been asserted as potential sources of 
bias in the estimated relationship.  Most of these problems arise from the use of repeated 
cross-section or time-series data.  Time-series data frequently suffers from structural 
instability and the inability to discern important aspects of economic behaviour that are 
masked by aggregate data.  Cross-section data, by contrast, suffers from an inability to study 
the dynamics of adjustment.  Both of these features run the risk of obtaining misleading 
results.  They also give rise to the increased likelihood that observed effects are the 
consequence of errors in model specification. Panel data, that is, data that follow a given 
sample of individuals over time, provide a number of significant advantages in this regard.  
Data that record multiple observations for an individual provide more informative data, more 
degrees of freedom, less collinearity among explanatory variables and greater control of 
individual heterogeneity.  It also allows for the control of individual fixed effects, effects that are 
either missing or unobserved but correlated with explanatory variables.  The ability to control for 
missing or unobserved data significantly reduces the probability of specification bias.  For the 
estimation of earnings equations, such features help capture inter and intra-individual differences 
                                                          
2 See Bean et al (1989) for details. 
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inherent in the determination of individual pay.  They also alleviate both aggregation3 and 
composition bias.4 
 
A number of recent studies document the existence of the wage curve using panel data.  
Bratsberg and Turunen (1996) present panel evidence for the US drawing on data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).  Janssens and Konings (1998) report 
evidence using the Belgian Social Economic Panel.  Finally, Pannenberg and Schwarze (1998) 
and Baltagi and Blien (1998) report evidence for Germany utilising the German Socio 
Economic Panel (GSOEP) and data from the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung 
(IAB).  None of these studies provide evidence for the UK. The purpose of this paper, 
therefore, is to test for the existence of a wage curve utilising genuine panel data drawn from 
the British Household Panel Survey Waves 1-8. In addition, we perform a variety of 
diagnostic tests concerning functional form and sample selection to test the robustness of the 
results. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 present a brief overview 
of recent research on the relationship between wages and unemployment and a more detailed 
discussion of the theoretical explanations for the Wage Curve.  Section 4 discusses the data 
while Section 5 outlines the methodology employed.  Empirical results and diagnostics are 
reported in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
                                                          
3 Moulton (1986) points out that aggregate variables used as explanatory variables in 
regressions based on microeconomic data typically result in the substantial downward bias of 
standard errors.  This bias arises from correlation across individuals brought about by a lack of 
controls for individual heterogeneity. 
4 Solon et al (1994) demonstrate that the use of wage data from repeated cross sections rather 
than genuine panel data may result in an upward bias of up to 50 percent in the estimated 
unemployment elasticity of pay. 
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II Early Literature 
The wage curve challenges economic orthodoxy.  Traditional neoclassical analysis built upon 
the models of Harris-Todaro (1970) and Hall (1970, 1972) posits a positive relationship 
between regional unemployment and pay.  Compensating differentials, it is argued, imply that 
regions of high unemployment should be regions of higher pay.  Firms faced with high 
unemployment pay higher wages to compensate for higher search costs.  Higher wages 
become affordable since high unemployment reduces quits and thus the costs of hiring and 
training.  A positive locus in wage-unemployment space is therefore predicted. 
 
Table 1 documents early research concerning the spatial distribution of wages and 
unemployment to support the existence of a positive wage locus.5  Hall (1970, 1972) reports 
weak evidence “that wages and unemployment rates are positively related in a cross section of 
cities”.6  Reza (1978) and Roback (1982) report likewise.  Reza extends Hall’s analysis to 
demonstrate that a positive unemployment elasticity of pay is neither the result of sample 
selection nor model misspecification.  Roback, in contrast, provides strong evidence of 
compensating differences across regional space.  The precise role of unemployment in this 
process remains, however, ambiguous. 
 
Adams (1985) extends the above framework to differentiate between temporary and 
permanent movements in the analysis of compensating differentials across space.  He 
develops a contract model where employees who lose their jobs in the face of random demand 
shocks receive unemployment insurance at a level below the full value of their wage.  He 
shows that for a job package offering the going market-utility rate, regional wages will be an 
                                                          
5 See Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b) for a comprehensive survey of this literature. 
6 Hall (1972), p. 733. 
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increasing function of the risk of unemployment and a decreasing function of the replacement 
ratio.  Empirical work supports this premise.  A well-defined and significant average state 
unemployment elasticity of the wage of 0.2 is reported.  This implies that a doubling of state 
unemployment would raise wages by 20 percent.  Curiously, current industry unemployment 
delivers an elasticity of –0.9.  Adams interprets this result as evidence of the need to 
distinguish temporary from permanent movements in wage-unemployment space.  Marston 
(1985) derives similar conclusions.  He reports that shocks that disturb the steady-state 
relationship between regions’ unemployment tend to be eliminated rapidly.  Predominant 
influences on observed unemployment rates appear thus to be the persistent ones of regional 
amenities and pay. 
 
Evidence to the mid 1980’s clearly supports the existence of a positive relationship in wage-
unemployment space.  By the late 1980’s this evidence had, however, begun to weaken.  
Blackaby and Manning (1987) estimate Phillips curve and Mincer-style wage equations.  They 
report the rate of wage change to depend upon the rate of change of prices, the rate of change 
of unemployment and the level of unemployment.  Microeconometric earnings level 
estimations using local unemployment as an independent variable additionally yield a 
significant negative unemployment elasticity of pay of –0.16.  Subsequent papers (Blackaby 
and Manning 1990a, 1990b, 1990c) extend this result to include the impact of regional fixed 
effects, costs of living and long-term unemployment.  These additions enter individual and 
regional earnings level equations as significant but reduce only slightly the estimated 
unemployment elasticity of pay. 
 




Table 1 - A Selective Summary of the Literature on the Relationship Between Wages and Unemployment 
 
Study Country Data Estimation notes Findings 
Hall (1970, 1972) US 1966 Data for 12 Cities 
 
Descriptive analysis and 
OLS wage equations 
Positive relationship between city pay and city unemployment for 
men.  Weak evidence of a positive relationship between both nominal 
and real wages and the unemployment rate. 
Reza (1978) US 1967, 1970-74 data for 
18 metropolitan areas 
OLS wage equations Positive relationship between both nominal and real wages and 
unemployment. 
Roback (1982) US 1973 CPS Data for 98 
Cities 
OLS wage and land rental 
rate equations 
Weak evidence of a positive relationship between male weekly 
earnings and local unemployment. 
Adams (1985) US 1970-76 PSID Data OLS wage equations Positive average unemployment elasticity of pay (≈0.2). 
Negative industry unemployment elasticity of pay (–0.09). 
Marston (1985) US 1970 CPS Data OLS wage equations and 
probit equations for 
employment 
Positive relationship between real area wage and unemployment for 
both types of equation. 
Blackaby and Manning (1987) UK 1964-84 Regional Data 
1974 GHS Data 
OLS Phillips Curve and 
Mincer-Style wage equations 
Negative unemployment elasticity of pay (–0.16) for Mincer-style 
wage equations.  Standard Phillips Curve results. 
Blackaby and Manning (1990a) UK 1970-86 Regional data Dynamic earnings equations Negative unemployment elasticity of pay for several UK regions 
Blackaby and Manning 
(1990b) 
UK 1970-86 Regional data 
1975, 1982 GHS data 
Mincerian/dynamic earnings 
equations 
Negative unemployment elasticity of pay  for both types of equation. 
Blackaby and Manning (1990c) UK 1975, 1982 GHS data Mincerian/dynamic earnings 
equations 
Negative local unemployment elasticity of pay (–0.13 and -0.19). 
Blackaby and Manning (1992) UK 1972-88 Regional data Dynamic wage equations Negative unemployment elasticity of pay . 
Layard and Nickell (1986, 
1987) 
UK 1950-83 Aggregate 
data 
Real dynamic wage equations Negative unemployment elasticity of wages (-0.06). 
Nickell (1987) UK 1956-83 Aggregate 
data 
Real dynamic wage equations Negative unemployment elasticity of wages (-0.1) 
Carruth and Oswald (1989) UK 1956-83 Aggregate 
data 
Real dynamic wage equations Negative unemployment elasticity of wages (–0.05 and -0.1) 
Pissarides and McMaster 
(1990) 
UK 1961-82 Regional data Error Correction models for 
pooled wage equations 
Negative short-run unemployment elasticity of pay. 
Positive long-run steady-state unemployment elasticity of pay. 
Freeman (1988) US, UK 1979-85 State/County 
data 
OLS real wage equations Weak negative correlation between changes in regional pay and 
changes in unemployment. 
Holmund and Skedinger (1990) Sweden 1969-85 Regional data 
for the wood industry 
Regional Panel wage drift 
equations 
Negative unemployment elasticity of pay (zero to -0.04). 
Card (1990) Canada 1963-83 Union 
Contracts Data 
OLS and IV first-differenced 
real wage equations 




is an interesting one.  Blackaby and Manning (1990c, 1992) and Blackaby and Hunt (1992) 
report long-term unemployment to reduce the impact of total unemployment on earnings, a 
finding which conforms to the prediction of Layard and Nickell (1986, 1987) that the long-
term unemployed exert little or no influence in wage determination.  Layard and Nickell 
derive this prediction from two findings in time-series econometric work: first, that the log 
rather than the level of the total unemployment rate appears to be a more robust specification 
when entered into a wage equation; second, that estimations including both the total and long-
term unemployment rates reveal exactly equal and opposite signs.  Both of these findings 
suggest that it is the short-term unemployed that exert downward pressure on wages.  Such 
findings do not exist in isolation.  Nickell (1987), Budd et al (1988) and Carruth and Oswald 
(1989) also identify the importance of the duration composition of unemployment in the wage 
determination process.  They too report the proportion of long-term unemployed to attenuate 
the downward pressure on wages exerted by total unemployment.  Precisely when the long-
term unemployed cease to exert downward pressure remains, however, unanswered. 
 
Further evidence to support the existence of a negative relationship in wage-unemployment 
space is found in Pissarides and McMaster (1990).  They report changes in a region’s relative 
wage to be correlated with movements in the region’s unemployment level; these changes 
vary, however, between the short and long-run.  This result could, of course, reflect incorrect 
dynamic specification of their model.  The result does, however, re-affirm the need to 
distinguish between temporary and permanent unemployment.  As previously discussed, 
actual wages may be negatively correlated with contemporaneous unemployment.  Permanent 




Consensus for the collapse of a positive association between regional unemployment and pay 
is not constrained to the UK.  Freeman (1988) offers weak evidence of a negative 
unemployment elasticity of pay for both the US and the UK.  Card (1990) reports similarly for 
Canada, while Holmlund and Skedinger (1990) present evidence for Sweden.7  Most of the 
debate regarding the wage curve centres, however, around Blanchflower and Oswald (1990).  
Utilising four microeconomic datasets (one from the US and three from the UK) and 
controlling for a number of individual and establishment characteristics, Blanchflower and 
Oswald estimate a series of cross-section and pooled cross-section wage equations and 
provide evidence of a significant inverse non-linear association between pay and 
unemployment. They investigate this non-linearity with the inclusion of higher order 
polynomials for the unemployment rate and proffer the level of unemployment and its square 
or alternatively the natural logarithm of unemployment and its cube as their preferred 
specifications.  An unrestricted specification where the distribution of unemployment is split 
into intervals of equal width confirms this curvature and again traces out a negative locus in 
wage-unemployment space.  This locus becomes horizontal between 9 per cent and 15 per 
cent unemployment.  Increases in unemployment above these levels fail thus to exert 
downward pressure on wages.  
 
Subsequent papers (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994a, 1995) and a comprehensive monograph 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994b) extend this analysis to deliver a simple log-linear function 
as the preferred specification for the wage curve.  Controlling for regional and industry fixed 
effects and estimating a variety of model specifications for both weekly and hourly earnings, 
                                                          
 
7 This latter finding is particularly interesting given the degree of centralised wage bargaining 




results indicate an inverse relationship between the level of regional pay and local 
unemployment.  The estimated unemployment elasticity of wages is approximately –0.1.  This 
result is robust to changes in the sample period and the inclusion of higher order 
unemployment measures.  It additionally turns insignificant or positive when regional fixed 
effects are excluded.  The failure of previous researchers to identify a negative locus in wage-
unemployment space is attributed thus to a failure to adequately control for the influence of 
regional fixed effects.  Regional fixed effects are correlated with the local unemployment rate.  
Estimations that exclude such effects thus suffer from classic omitted variable bias. 
 
 
III Theoretical Issues 
The evidence and debate summarised in the previous section presents overwhelming support 
for the existence of a new empirical law of economics.  This law appears robust with respect 
to both specification and country.  It also appears stable over time.  As such, further 
investigation into the precise nature of this relationship is clearly warranted.  Such 
investigation requires, however, a theoretical foundation.  Competitive theory fails in this 
regard.  Explaining the wage curve is thus a stimulating challenge.  
 
Some commentators argue the wage curve is some form of misspecified labour supply 
function where unemployment may be regarded as the inverse of employment for a fixed 
labour force.  If the wage curve is such a function, the unemployment rate should perform 
statistically worse in a wage equation than conventional labour supply variables such as the 
participation rate or the employment to population ratio. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) 
test this hypothesis using 1973-1990 GHS data for Britain and report no evidence to support 
the idea of the wage curve as a labour supply function.  A variable for the regional 
  
10 
participation rate always enters wage equations as insignificantly different from zero.  Local 
unemployment also dominates it.  This suggests that it is local unemployment rather than the 
size of the local labour market that influences wages.  Competitive theory is thus rejected. 
 
Instead of being a mismeasured labour supply curve, the wage curve could be a misspecified 
Phillips Curve.8  Here, model specification should relate a change in the regional wage to 
unemployment rather than the level of wages itself.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b) reject 
this proposition.  They argue that the Phillips Curve is primarily concerned with inflation and 
the effect of aggregate unemployment.  As such, it essentially proposes a disequilibrium 
adjustment mechanism.  The wage curve, in contrast, focuses on the role of local 
unemployment.  It represents an equilibrium locus in wage-unemployment space that is 
derived from microeconomic analyses rather than macroeconomic analyses.9  This theoretical 
distinction is reinforced by econometric consideration where the distinction between the two 
concepts essentially rests upon wage dynamics.  A significant autoregressive component in 
dynamic wage equations would support the Phillips Curve specification.  Blanchflower and 
Oswald find little evidence, however, to support this.  Instead, their results suggest the idea of 
a Phillips Curve to be misleading.  Failure to estimate using suitable control variables, 
particularly those for fixed effects, results in spuriously large coefficients on lagged dependent 
wage variables.  They assert, therefore, that the correct specification should indeed express the 
level of wages as a function of the unemployment level. 
 
                                                          
8 See Paldam (1990) and Black and FitzRoy (1997) for detailed discussion. 
9 The Phillips Curve is traditionally estimated using time-series macroeconomic data.  The 




Having rejected the wage curve as a misspecified labour supply curve or indeed a Phillips 
Curve, Blanchflower and Oswald argue that the wage curve may represent a non-competitive 
account of the labour market.  They offer several explanations consistent with this empirical 
phenomenon including a bargaining model and an efficiency wage model.10  
 
The bargaining model utilises a conventional framework similar to that presented in Carruth 
and Oswald (1989).  This model asserts that a high degree of joblessness might be expected to 
reduce the ability of workers to bargain for a share of economic rents.  High unemployment 
serves here as a potential threat to the employee.  In the event of a permanent impasse, 
workers may be forced to seek alternative employment.  The probability of re-employment 
falls as local unemployment increases.  Assuming that unions have concerns for both 
employed and unemployed members, rising joblessness might then incline union preferences 
towards the preservation of jobs rather than the share of rents.  A reduced concern for rents 
may result in a lower level of negotiated pay.  An inverse association between the level of 
wages and unemployment should then be observed. 
 
Efficiency wage models operate in a manner not dissimilar from the arguments presented 
above.  The approach, however, is typically non-union and is thus ideally suited to economies 
where unionisation and coverage is reported as low.  Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) provide the 
archetypal model.  Firms set pay in a working environment where the wage influences 
productivity.  Workers are risk-neutral and choose between exerting effort or shirking.  Utility 
is derived from wages and disutility from work.  Regional equilibrium prevails if firms offer 
                                                          
10 A labour contract model is also presented.  This model, as in the case for labour supply, 
relies, however, on the movement of wages and employment.  As such, it too rests on the key 




pay packages of equal expected utility across regions.  A non-shirking constraint necessitates, 
however, that firms offer a net wage greater than the value of unemployment.  Workers caught 
shirking are fired.  Expected utility when fired depends on the level of unemployment 
insurance and the probability of re-employment.  The probability of re-employment decreases 
with the level of unemployment.  Increases in unemployment serve thus to discipline workers 
into providing greater efforts.  Greater efforts ensure that the non-shirking condition requires a 
lower wage at higher unemployment.  An efficiency wage is thus also consistent with a 
negative locus in wage-unemployment space. 
 
Theoretical justification of the wage curve by non-competitive models of the labour market 
does not mean that the Harris-Todaro concept of compensating differentials is necessarily 
wrong.  The Harris-Todaro locus sits comfortably alongside the existence of the wage curve 
once permanent and transitory movements in pay and unemployment are accounted for.  The 
above models do, however, pertain to a number of interesting caveats.  Card (1995), for 
example, points out that efficiency wage models comfortably entertain differences in the slope 
of the wage curve across different groups of workers.  He argues that for such models, wages 
of a particular group of workers are related to the group-specific unemployment rate.  High 
unemployment for one group of workers should thus have no effect on another group.  This is 
an interesting implication, especially with regard to the identification of unemployment 
elasticities across disaggregated curves.11 More important, however, is the implication that the 
models replace the conventional labour supply curve with a wage-fixing function, a function 
that lies flatter and to the left of the true Marshallian labour supply.  This function is 
compatible with a new generation of macroeconomic models in which an aggregate wage 
                                                          
11 See, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a), Card (1995) and Turunen (1998). 
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curve is the distinguishing feature.12 The wage curve may thus provide the missing empirical 
foundation for such models.  There remains, however, much to be learned. 
 
This paper explicitly addresses the existence of a wage curve by utilising genuine panel data 
for the UK.  Previous studies for the UK rely on pooled and cross-section data for the 1970’s 
and 1980’s.  Our paper, in contrast, utilises data drawn from the 1990’s.  Thus, our paper 
presents two major additions to the existent UK literature.  First, it provides a framework for 
analysis during the 1990’s, a period where the level and structural composition of 
unemployment has witnessed a marked change from the preceding decades.  Second, the panel 
dimension of the data allows us to take account of the role of unobserved worker 
heterogeneity in the wage determination process.  This latter feature enables us to explain a 




We estimate the UK wage curve using longitudinal micro data drawn from the 1991-1998 
(eight) waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally representative 
survey of households randomly selected south of the Caledonian Canal.13 The BHPS was 
designed as an annual survey of each adult member (age 16 or over) from a nationally 
representative sample of more than 5,000 households, providing a total of approximately 
                                                          
 
12 See Layard et al (1991) for an overview of this literature. 
13 The north of Scotland is thus excluded. 
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10,000 individual interviews.14 The first wave of the BHPS was conducted from September 
1991 to January 1992, subsequent waves have been collected annually thereafter.15  
 
The BHPS provides a rich source of socio-economic variables at the individual and household 
level.  The dependent variable that we derive from these data is the natural logarithm of the 
real hourly wage.  This is calculated as the ratio of usual gross pay per month (a derived 
variable that measures usual monthly wage or salary payment before tax and other deductions 
in current main job for employees), and the total number of hours normally worked per week, 
scaled by average weeks per month.16  This is then deflated by the monthly RPI (base period 
January 1991). 
 
The richness of the BHPS permits a wide variety of both personal and workplace controls in 
our wage equations.  Personal controls include gender, race, marital status, highest educational 
qualification, head of household indicator, and the presence of children in the household and 
their age profile.  Additional information regarding an individual’s health along with their 
recent labour market history are also included.  A piecewise linear spline for age is used to 
capture the expected profile of lifetime earnings.17 
 
                                                          
14 From Wave Seven the BHPS has incorporated a sub-sample of the original United 
Kingdom European Community Household Panel (UKECHP), including all households still 
responding in Northern Ireland.  For consistency purposes across the panel, these new sample 
members are excluded from analysis. 
15 See Taylor (1998) for details. 
16 The data provides separate information regarding the number of hours normally worked per 
week (excluding overtime and meal breaks), the number of overtime hours worked in a 
normal week, and the number of overtime hours worked as paid overtime. We define total 
hours as normal hours plus overtime. 
17 The linear spline is preferred to imposing the constraints implied by the usual quadratic in 
age or experience. 
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Workplace and workforce controls which can be expected to impinge upon earnings include 
unionisation (recognition and membership), full or part time job status, promotion 
opportunities, a number of variables capturing the structure of pay and pay increases, 
seasonal/temporary or contract work, rotating shifts, managerial duties and supervisory tasks.  
Any remaining firm-specific effects are captured by the inclusion of firm size and public-
private sector indicators.18 Industry and occupational affiliation are coded using the 1980 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and the 1990 OPCS Standard Occupational 
Classification.  We utilise 1-digit classification dummies to control for variation of wages 
across both occupation and industry. 
 
Regional dummies are included to capture the multitude of effects brought about by 
geographical differences in industry and institutional structure. Regional fixed-effects help to 
explain why, for certain regions, real wages appear lower regardless of the unemployment 
rate.19  The regional unemployment rate is an appropriate measure for wage adjustment when 
individuals reside and work within the same regional domain. However, highly mobile 
individuals who commute outside of their region of residence present a problem to this 
analysis. Workers who reside in high unemployment areas but commute to work in a high 
wage area, for example, generate a spurious positive relationship between the regional 
unemployment rate and regional pay.  Fortunately, the BHPS contains information concerning 
both the location of work and the amount of time the individual usually spends travelling to 
work each day.  We include a dummy variable therefore if the individual’s travel time is 
                                                          
 
 
18 A positive association between wages and firm size is well established. See Brown and 
Medoff (1989) and Green et al (1996) for details. 
19 Regional unemployment is drawn from NOMIS and is matched to the data at the level of 
the standard region by month and year of interview. 
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greater than 45 minutes.  This should help capture movement across regional boundaries and 
reduce potential underestimation of the unemployment effect brought about by movement 
from high unemployment regions to regions of high pay.  Time dummies and the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of regional to national consumer prices are additionally included to 
capture cyclical effects on wages and the impact of regional price variations.20,21 
 
The sample is selected on the basis that the individual is aged 16 to retirement age and has a 
current status of employee.  Retired and self-employed ‘workers’, the unemployed, individuals 
working on government schemes and ‘inactive’ sections of the working-age population are 
thus excluded. Individuals who have missing relevant information or who are not interviewed 
at a particular wave are also excluded.  Individuals who enter and exit the sample across the 
panel are, however, allowed.  Whilst this results in an unbalanced panel in our econometric 
analysis, it does serve to minimise potential attrition biases and yields a greater numbers of 
observations in the panel when controlling for fixed effects. 
 
We estimate our wage equations separately for men and women.22  In addition, to alleviate 
potential biases from serious over or under estimation of earnings, we symmetrically trim the 
male and female samples and omit the one percent with both the highest and lowest real 
                                                          
20 Blackaby et al (1991) show that the usual practise of calculating the real wage by simply 
deflating nominal wage rates by the national retail price index is inadequate where workers 
recognise regional price variations and act upon it in wage bargaining.  They argue that, unless 
the national price index is all important, the omission of a relative regional to national price 
term is likely to seriously mis-specify the wage relationship and bias the coefficients of 
explanatory variables that capture other regionally varying factors.  Since the unemployment 
term is one such variable in our wage equations, we include the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of regional to national prices in our analysis. 
21 Regional price information is provided by The Reward Group (2000). 
22 The problems of measuring the labour market experiences of married women are well 
recognised.  Concerns regarding gender differences in the rates of return to educational 
attainment are also acknowledged. 
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hourly wages.  These additional restrictions result in a male sample of 17,080 data points 
(4,224 individuals) and a female sample of 17,421 (4,286 individuals).  The gender 
distribution across the panel is presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.  Table A2 details the 
total number of waves for which each individual is observed.  Data definitions and summary 




We use an econometric technique that takes into account the panel nature of the data and 
estimate a fixed-effects model where unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity is assumed 
to be time-invariant but correlated with explanatory variables. 
 
The basic framework is a regression model of the form: 
 ln it i it itw x vα β= + + ,       1, , , 1, , ,i N t T= =K K  (1) 
where ln itw  is the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage of worker i at time t, iα  is an 
individual-specific component of wages reflecting observed time-invariant individual 
heterogeneity such as gender and race, and itv  is a random error term independently and 
identically distributed over i and t. 
 
Assuming unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity to be time-invariant, the error term itv  
can be decomposed as: 
 it i itv u e= + . (2) 





Equation (1) may now be written: 
 ln it i it i itw x u eα β= + + +  (3) 
Averaging over time gives: 
 ...ln iiiii euxw +++= βα  (4) 
Subtracting equation (4) from (3) thus yields: 
 ( ) ( )...lnln iitiitiit eexxww −+−=− β  (5) 
This is the fixed-effects (or within) estimator.  The within estimator produces consistent and 
efficient estimates of the identifiable parameters when the time-invariant effects are assumed 
correlated with itx . 
 
 
VI Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports results for alternative specifications of log earnings equations for UK males 
1991-1998.  Column 1 adopts a semi-logarithmic specification that relates the log of real 
hourly wages to the level of unemployment implying the wage–unemployment relationship is 
exponential.  The reported coefficient is significant and provides an estimated elasticity of 
-0.14 evaluated at the mean.  This elasticity is statistically significantly different from -0.1 but 
lies within the rough band of zero to -0.15 proposed by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b).  
The existence of a well-defined unemployment effect for UK males is thus supported. 
 
Column 3 replaces the semi-logarithmic specification with a double-log specification.  The 
estimated elasticity is again significant but is approximately -0.05.  This result is surprising 
and contrasts with Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994a) and Blackaby et al (1991) both of 
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whom find little to choose statistically between the log of unemployment and the 
unemployment level.  The double-log specification is often preferred on the basis of 
expositional ease: the reported coefficient may be immediately interpreted as the elasticity in 
question.  It imposes, however, significant constraints on the data.  A double-log specification 
considers the relationship between wages and unemployment to be log-linear across the whole 
range of observed data.  This implies a constant unemployment elasticity of wages.  It also 
implies, in the levels, that the relationship between wages and unemployment is either 
increasing or decreasing without limit.  The semi-logarithmic equation, by contrast, is not so 
restrictive.  It also has desirable features in terms of interpretation in that the estimated 
function will be asymptotic.  A negative sign on unemployment implies a downward sloping 
locus in wage-unemployment space.  This locus will, however, never reach the x-axis.  In 
Table 2 
Estimates of the UK Wage Curve: Males 1991-1998 
Dependent Variable: log real hourly wage 
Unemployment 1 2 3 4 
U -0.0188 (3.43)† -0.0133 (1.77)*     
U2   -0.0004 (1.04)     
Log U     -0.0489 (2.08)** -0.0040 (0.14) 
Log U3       -0.0108 (2.51)** 
ε -0.14  -0.15  -0.05  -0.13  
Diagnostics         
F 30.94  30.60  30.83  30.56  
R2 0.9323  0.9324  0.9323  0.9323  
Specification Test -0.0100 [0.488] -0.0102 [0.490] -0.0094 [0.508] -0.0099 [0.494] 
NT 17,080  17,080  17,080  17,080  
 
Notes 
1. All specifications control for unobserved individual heterogeneity and include the following controls: 7 
segment piecewise linear spline for age and dummies for marital status (3), highest qualification (7), 
registered disabled, health limits work, head of household, own children in household, age of children in 
household (3), recent labour market experience (2), region (11), occupation (9), industry (9), firm size (8), 
full-time work, temporary work, contract work, employment sector (8), union recognition, union member, 
manager, supervisor, shift worker, bonus in pay, annual increments in pay, travel to work time greater than 45 
minutes, time (8 waves). 
2. Estimations by Intercooled Stata 6.0.  Coefficient t-values in parentheses.  Significance levels: †(0.01), 
**(0.05), *(0.10); p-values of diagnostics in []. 
3. The Hausman test for random-effects models is rejected for all specifications. 
4. The specification test is due to Pregibon (1980).  Similar to a standard RESET test in time series analysis, it is 





reality, wages will never equal zero.  For this purpose, the semi-logarithmic specification is 
our preferred equation. 
 
Non-linearities provide a recurring theme in the wage curve literature.  Evidence from 
Blanchflower and Oswald is, however, mixed.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) find 
different polynomial structures to fit the data well.  Though hard to interpret economically, 
they find, for example, that the inclusion of a cubic term for the logarithm of unemployment 
improves their estimates.  Later evidence, by contrast, rejects the inclusion of such higher 
order unemployment terms.23 We test for non-linearities by adding cubic or squared terms of 
unemployment in logs and levels.24  Column 2 imposes a quadratic on the unemployment-log-
wage relationship.  The estimated unemployment elasticity of pay is little different from that 
of the semi-logarithmic specification.  The inclusion of a square term for unemployment fails, 
however, to improve the performance of the original equation and its coefficient is small and 
insignificantly different from zero.  Column 4 adopts a specification including the natural 
logarithm of unemployment and its cube.  Again, there is evidence of a well-defined 
unemployment effect.  The cubic term in unemployment is highly significant, although the 
coefficient on the log of unemployment becomes small and insignificantly different from zero.  
This evidence, illustrated in Figure 1, suggests that the previous literature may be wrong to 
assume a double-log specification as the appropriate functional form for estimation of the UK 
wage curve.  We test this assumption further and utilise a J-test to select between the semi-
logarithmic and double-log specifications of unemployment.25  The test rejects the double-log 
                                                          
23 See Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a). 
24 We also estimated our wage equations using the inverse of unemployment, and the inverse 
of unemployment and its square.  Neither of these specifications identified a significant 
unemployment effect nor added to the overall fit of the equation. Thus, these additional results 
are not reported. 
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Notes uw β+α= ˆln 1 , 22 ˆˆln uuw γ+β+α= , uw lnˆln 3 β+α= , 34 lnˆlnˆln uuw γ+β+α= . 
 
specification against the semi-logarithmic specification and accepts the semi-logarithmic 
specification against the double-log specification at conventional levels.  Thus, the semi-
logarithmic specification is statistically preferred and our original preference for the level of 
unemployment is supported. 
 
Table 3 presents equivalent estimates for the female sample.26  The main finding is that there 
is no evidence of a significant wage curve for women.  The estimated elasticity of pay for our 
                                                          
26 Given the focus of this paper, and constraints on space, it is not possible to report the 
coefficients on other controls variables utilised in estimation across both the male and female 
samples.  Full results for the semi-logarithmic specification are, however, reported in Table 
A5 of the appendix.  These reveal that the estimated wage equations appear to be both 
meaningful and appropriate in that they are consistent with a large previous literature on wage 
determination.  Thus, for example, ceteris paribus, age-earnings profiles are concave 
(although earnings increase over any individual’s lifetime); households with children depress 
female earnings; there are significant private returns to college qualifications (e.g. degree or 
teaching certificate) though the effect is greater for women than for men; seasonal or 
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preferred equation is identical to that of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b).27 The coefficients 
for alternative specifications of unemployment are, however, either small and/or 
insignificantly different from zero.  This result is consistent with the panel findings of both 
Janssens and Konings (1997) and Pannenberg and Schwarze (1998).  The lack of a significant 
wage curve for women may indicate that the female labour market is more competitive than 
the male labour market.  It might also indicate problems concerning non-employment 
(unemployment) and/or non-participation.  Simultaneity bias due to the endogeneity of local 
unemployment provides another likely cause.28  We do not test for endogeneity in this paper.  
Recent work by Baltagi and Blien (1998) suggests, however, accounting for endogeneity to be 
an important task for future work. 
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Notes 
See notes to Table 2. Table 3 
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Previous studies for the UK report the addition of regional fixed effects as having little impact 
on estimated wage curve elasticities.29  Pencavel (1994) argues that this may reflect a greater 
degree of permanence in the geographical distribution of unemployment.  Permanence in 
unemployment rates is certainly reflected in UK data for the 1980’s.  Unemployment rates for 
the 1990’s, however, exhibit a significant downward trend with marked changes regarding 
both structure and composition.  We test the above hypothesis, therefore, and re-estimate our 
wage equations on the original male sample excluding regional fixed effects.  The results are 
reported in Table 4.  The exclusion of regional fixed effects reduces the absolute size of the 
coefficients for the unemployment terms for all specifications.  There is, however, 
comparatively little difference to the findings reported earlier in Table 2.  Estimated 
elasticities of pay are biased downwards but remain within close proximity of –0.1.  The 
coefficient for the level of the unemployment rate in our preferred equation also remains 
significant at conventional levels.  The robustness of these results suggests the inclusion of 
regional fixed effects to not be necessary in identifying a significant negative locus in wage-
unemployment space.  In this context, permanence in UK unemployment rates is again 
supported.30 
 
Many studies estimate the wage curve on the basis of weekly, monthly or annual earnings.  To 
test the robustness of our results we therefore re-estimate male earnings equations using two 
alternative specifications for the dependent variable.  Table 5 reports results using the log of 
                                                          
29 This contrasts with studies for US data where the omission of regional dummies exerts an 
upward bias on estimated elasticities and in some instances turns them positive. 
30 The inclusion of regional fixed effects eliminates the ‘permanent’ components of 
unemployment from the wage-unemployment relationship.  Thus, similarity across estimates 
when regional fixed effects are excluded suggests that the dominant component of the 




The UK Wage Curve: Males 1991-1998 Excluding Regional Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: log real hourly wage 
Unemployment 1 2 3 4 
U -0.0143 (3.28)† -0.0090 (1.29)     
U2   -0.0004 (0.99)     
Log U     -0.0480 (2.26)** -0.0034 (0.11) 
Log U3       -0.0083 (2.19)** 
ε -0.11  -0.11  -0.05  -0.10  
Diagnostics         
F 34.79  34.35  34.70  34.32  
R2 0.9323  0.9323  0.9322  0.9323  
Specification Test -0.0107 [0.463] -0.0109 [0.463] -0.0099 [0.487] -0.0106 [0.467] 
NT 17,080  17,080  17,080  17,080  
 
Notes 
See notes to Table 2. 
Table 5 
The UK Wage Curve: Males 1991-1998  
Dependent Variable: log real monthly pay 
Unemployment 1 2 3 4 
U -0.0190 (3.72)† -0.0154 (2.18)**     
U2   -0.0003 (0.74)     
Log U     -0.0526 (2.40)** -0.0083 (0.30) 
Log U3       -0.0107 (2.66)† 
ε -0.14  -0.15  -0.05  -0.13  
Diagnostics         
F 95.58  94.50  95.43  94.47  
R2 0.9415  0.9415  0.9414  0.9415  
Specification Test -0.0214 [0.000] -0.0217 [0.000] -0.0207 [0.000] -0.0212 [0.000] 
NT 17,080  17,080  17,080  17,080  
 
Notes 
Controls are as those reported for Table 2.  However, the log of hours worked is additionally included. 
real monthly pay as the dependent variable.  In contrast, Table 6 presents estimates when the 
real hourly wage is derived using usual hours of work (i.e. excluding overtime). The issue of 
hours worked is complex.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b) and others, for example, define 
wages as annual earnings.  This is often due to the lack of a more appropriate measure.  Card 
(1995) indicates, however, that this may be inappropriate and asserts that part of the negative 
  
25 
relationship between annual earnings and local unemployment may be caused by a response in 
hours worked.31 Evidence to support this criticism is mixed.  Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994a, 1994b) report similar elasticities for both annual and/or weekly earnings and hourly 
wages.  Card, in contrast, reports an unemployment elasticity of pay for annual earnings twice 
that of the estimated elasticity for hourly wages.  Such results are surprising.  They are, 
however, indicative of the problems faced by labour economists in the use of retrospective 
data and reported hours of work.32 
 
The results for the UK wage curve utilising alternative measures of the dependent variable are 
remarkably similar to those reported in Table 2.  The semi-logarithmic equation is again 
preferred to the double-log specification.  Estimated elasticities also remain virtually identical 
with both the unemployment level and the logarithm and its cube, delivering an 
                                                          
31 Card argues that since annual earnings are the product of annual hours and hourly wages, 
and annual hours are highly correlated with contemporaneous unemployment, the wage curve 
may in fact reflect an ‘hours curve’. 
32 See Hamermesh (1998) for discussion of this data and the misapplication of standard 
econometric techniques in labormetric research. 
Table 6 
The UK Wage Curve: Males 1991-1998  
Dependent Variable: log real hourly wage excluding overtime 
Unemployment 1 2 3 4 
U -0.0192 (3.46)† -0.0153 (2.00)**     
U2   -0.0003 (0.73)     
Log U     -0.0533 (2.24)** -0.0089 (0.30) 
Log U3       -0.0107 (2.45)** 
ε -0.14  -0.15  -0.05  -0.13  
Diagnostics         
F 35.34  35.13  35.44  35.11  
R2 0.9308  0.9308  0.9308  0.9308  
Specification Test -0.0009 [0.860] -0.0010 [0.853] -0.0008 [0.880] -0.0008 [0.879] 
NT 17,080  17,080  17,080  17,080  
 
Notes 
See notes to Table 2. 
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unemployment elasticity of pay significantly different from –0.1.  Such robustness would 
appear to suggest that the wage curve is largely insensitive to demand shocks and the 
adjustment of individuals’ working hours.  It also indicates that switching from an hourly 
wage to monthly pay variable has no impact on the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
To confirm the generality and robustness of our results, a number of additional specifications 
were examined. First, to test that the results were not heavily influenced by a few outliers, we 
adopt the approach of Miles (1997) and re-estimate the preferred equation with the weight on 
observation i the reciprocal of its squared residual.  This technique provides a good test for 
heteroscedasticity since a lower weight is attached to large residuals.  Neither the parameter 
estimates nor their statistical significance are substantially different from the original 
estimates.  This suggests that heteroscedasticity is not a significant problem in the data.33  
Normality of the residuals’ distribution was additionally checked by residual histograms.  
Again, there is no evidence of non-normality though the distribution reveals weak 
leptokurtosis.34 
 
Second, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the fact that our sample is an 
unbalanced panel of individuals, some of whom were only interviewed on relatively few 
occasions (see Table A2). The results obtained from re-estimating the male earnings equations 
using only the balanced panel (and thus only individuals who were observed in all 8 waves) 
                                                          
 
33 Accordingly, these weighted regressions are not reported. 
34 Kurtosis measures the degree of peakedness of a probability function near the mode.  The 
normal distribution is said to be mesokurtic, one less peaked is said to be platykurtic, and one 
more peaked is said to be leptokurtic. 
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are reported in Table 7.35  Again, there is evidence of a negatively sloped relationship in 
wage-unemployment space.  However, this relationship is neither statistically significant nor 
well-defined.  Insignificance of the coefficients may indicate a problem concerning 
estimation.36 Nonetheless, sample selection provides a more likely reason.  Balanced panels 
are often preferred when sample selection issues brought about by attrition are considered to 
be important.  Selecting observations for those individuals who report earnings across all eight 
waves, however, raises significant issues of its own.  The main effect of this selection 
criterion is to considerably reduce the sample size and thus information by which an 
unemployment effect may be identified.  Another significant effect concerns the selection of 
those individuals for whom unemployment may not serve as an appropriate disciplining 
device.  Balanced panels, observed over the business cycle, suppress compositional change in 
                                                          
35 These results additionally utilise the longitudinal respondent weights provided with the 
BHPS data to correct for the sample design and non-response rates. Technically, these 
individual weights should be used in any analysis utilising the BHPS to ensure that the 
marginal distributions in the data match the known distribution in the population. 
36 Card (1995) points out that the local unemployment rate does not vary across individuals.  
The ‘degrees of freedom’ in estimation of the wage curve is thus equal to the number of 
regions times the number of time periods.  This paper uses data for eleven standard regions 
across eight waves of data.  The actual ‘degrees of freedom’ is thus 88. 
Table 7 
The UK Wage Curve: Male Balanced Panel 1991-1998  
Dependent Variable: log real hourly wage 
Unemployment 1 2 3 4 
U -0.0041 (0.57) -0.0038 (0.39)     
U2   -0.0001 (0.05)     
Log U     -0.0245 (0.81) -0.0286 (0.76) 
Log U3       -0.0010 (0.18) 
ε -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  -0.04  
Diagnostics         
F 13.58  13.42  13.58  35.11  
R2 0.9200  0.9200  0.9200  0.9308  
NT 6,368  6,368  6,368  6,368  
 
Notes 
See notes to Table 2.  
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the labour market brought about by changes in the experience and composition of 
unemployment.37  Recognising the nature of sample restrictions is thus of critical importance. 
 
Finally, we estimate the UK wage curve utilising a non-parametric approach.  The estimates in 
Tables 2-7 impose assumptions regarding the functional form of unemployment.  Table 8 
adopts the approach of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a, 1994b) and reports results utilising 
an unrestricted specification where the distribution of unemployment is split into 5% 
segments of approximately equal size, each segment being replaced by an unemployment 
dummy.38 Taking the first interval as the reference group, all nineteen dummies are negative 
and statistically significant at conventional levels.  The absolute size of the coefficients also 
increases as the unemployment rate rises.  Figure 2 plots the antilogs of the coefficients 
against the mid-point of the unemployment range for each dummy.  There is clear evidence 
                                                          
37 Gregg et al (1999) present recent evidence that suggests that the cost of job loss for an 
average worker following involuntary unemployment is approximately 9 percent of previous 
earnings. 
38 Each dummy identifies between two and ten regions depending on the number of 
observations. 
Table 8 
5% Disaggregations: UK males 1991-1998 
Unemployment (%) Coefficient Unemployment (%) Coefficient 
2.5-3.1 -      - 8.5-8.9 -0.1158 (3.62) † 
3.2-4.0 -0.0437 (2.74) † 9.0-9.2 -0.1271 (3.91) † 
4.1-4.9 -0.0468 (3.01) † 9.3 -0.1256 (3.55) † 
5.0-5.4 -0.0564 (3.08) † 9.4-9.5 -0.1395 (3.98) † 
5.5-5.7 -0.0660 (3.68) † 9.6-10.0 -0.1375 (3.78) † 
5.8-6.0 -0.0582 (2.88) † 10.1-10.4 -0.1652 (4.27) † 
6.1-6.6 -0.0859 (4.12) † 10.5-11.1 -0.1700 (4.30) † 
6.7-6.9 -0.0995 (4.10) † 11.2-12.9 -0.1863 (4.12) † 
7.0-7.5 -0.0869 (3.42) †    
7.6-7.7 -0.1026 (3.78) † F 25.84 
7.8-8.2 -0.0933 (3.41) † R2 0.9325 
8.3-8.4 -0.1169 (4.17) † NT 17,080 
 




for a downward sloping locus in wage-unemployment space.  A curve linking the antilogged 
coefficients additionally suggests this locus to be broadly linear.  Rejection of higher order 
polynomial terms for unemployment earlier in the paper is thus clearly supported. 
 
 
VII Summary and Conclusions 
This paper investigates the empirical evidence for a UK wage curve using longitudinal micro 
data drawn from the first eight waves of the British Household Panel Survey.  The main 
finding is that there is evidence of a negative relationship in wage-unemployment space.  This 
finding is robust to alterations in the nature of the dependent variable and the exclusion of 
regional fixed effects.  It is, however, sensitive to sample selection and indicates distinct 
differences across identifiable labour market groups.  The estimated unemployment elasticity 
of pay for UK males is approximately equal to –0.14.  There is no evidence of a female wage 
curve.  These findings are consistent with the panel studies reported for other countries. They 
Figure 2 























contrast with previous studies for the UK, however, in that they reject the inclusion of higher 
order polynomial terms for unemployment.  The main findings of the paper, therefore, are that 
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Distribution of Observations for BHPS Waves 1-8 
 Wave of Interview Males Females 
 Wave 1 2280 2278 
 Wave 2 2068 2087 
 Wave 3 1967 2043 
 Wave 4 1986 2075 
 Wave 5 1978 2051 
 Wave 6 2084 2144 
 Wave 7 2320 2319 
 Wave 8 2397 2424 
 N 17,080 17,421 
 
Table A2 
Distribution of Individuals for BHPS Waves 1-8 
 No. of Waves Individual is observed Males Females 
 1 Wave 1055 1014 
 2 Waves 699 713 
 3 Waves 408 413 
 4 Waves 330 348 
 5 Waves 275 327 
 6 Waves 287 317 
 7 Waves 374 419 
 8 Waves 796 735 




Table A3: Data Definitions 
 
Variable Definition and Description 
Dependent Variable:  
    Log of real hourly wage Log of real hourly wage  
Independent Variables:  
    Age Age of individual at December of interview 
Race  
    White  (1,0) if white 
    Black (1,0) if black ethnic origin 
    Other non-white (1,0) if other ethnic origin 
Marital Status  
    Never Married  (1,0) if never married 
    Married or Living as a Couple  (1,0) if married or living as a couple 
    Widowed/Separated/Divorced (1,0) if widowed, separated or divorced  
Highest Qualification  
    Higher or First Degree, Teaching (1,0) qualification dummy 
    Other Higher Education  (1,0) qualification dummy 
    GCE A-level (1,0) qualification dummy 
    GCE O-level  (1,0) qualification dummy 
    CSE Grade1-5 (1,0) qualification dummy 
    Apprenticeship, Nursing, Other  (1,0) qualification dummy 
    No Qualification (1,0) qualification dummy 
Health  
    Registered Disabled (1,0) if registered disabled 
    Limits types of work (1,0) if health limits type or amount of work 
Other Personal Controls  
    Head of Household (1,0) if head of household 
    Own Children  (1,0) if own children in household 
    Children aged 0-4 Years  (1,0) if children aged <5 years in household 
    Children aged 5-11 Years (1,0) if children aged 5-11 years in household 
    Children aged 12-15 Years (1,0) if children aged 12-15 years in household 
    Unemployed in Past Year (1,0) if unemployment spell(s) in past year 
    Non-Participant in Past Year (1,0) if non-participation spell(s) in past year 
Size of Establishment  
    <10 Employees  (1,0) if <10 employees 
    10-24 Employees (1,0) if 10-24 employees 
    25-49 Employees (1,0) if 25-49 employees 
    50-99 Employees (1,0) if 50-99 employees 
    100-199 Employees (1,0) if 100-199 employees 
    200-499 Employees (1,0) if 200-499 employees 
    500-999 Employees (1,0) if 500-999 employees 
    >1000 Employees (1,0) if >1000 employees 
Workplace and Other Controls  
    Full-time (1,0) if work >30 hours per week 
    Seasonal or Temporary Work (1,0) if job seasonal or temporary 
    Fixed time or Contract Work (1,0) if job fixed time or contract 
    Promotion Opportunities  (1,0) if job has promotion opportunities 
    Bonuses or Profit (1,0) if pay includes bonuses or profits 
    Annual Increments (1,0) if pay includes annual increments 
    Union or Staff Association (1,0) if union or staff association at workplace 
    Member of Union (1,0) if member of workplace union 
    Member of Other Union (1,0) if member of non-workplace union 
    Rotating Shifts (1,0) if work involves rotating shifts 
    Manager (1,0) if manager 
    Supervisor (1,0) if supervisor 
    Travel ≥45 Minutes (1,0) if travel to work time ≥45 Minutes 




Employing Organisation  
    Private  (1,0) if private sector 
    Civil Service (1.0) if civil service 
    Local Govt. (1,0) if local government 
    NHS or Hospital (1,0) if NHS or hospital 
    Nationalised Industry (1,0) if nationalised Industry 
    Non-profit organisation (1,0) if non-profit organisation  
    Armed Forces (1,0) if armed forces 
    Other (1,0) if other sector 
Occupation Major Groups  
    Managers and Administrators (1,0) occupation dummy 
    Professional Occupations (1,0) occupation dummy 
    Associate Professionals and Technical (1,0) occupation dummy 
    Clerical and Secretarial  (1,0) occupation dummy 
    Craft and Related (1,0) occupation dummy 
    Personal and Protective Services (1,0) occupation dummy 
    Sales (1,0) occupation dummy 
    Plant and Machine Operatives (1,0) occupation dummy 
    Other Occupations (1,0) occupation dummy 
1-digit industry groups  
    Agriculture, forestry and fishing (1,0) industry dummy 
    Energy and water supplies (1,0) industry dummy 
    Minerals, metal manufacture and chemicals (1,0) industry dummy 
    Metal goods, engineering and vehicles (1,0) industry dummy 
    Other manufacturing (1,0) industry dummy 
    Construction (1,0) industry dummy 
    Distribution, hotels and catering (1,0) industry dummy 
    Transport and communication (1,0) industry dummy 
    Banking, finance, insurance and business services (1,0) industry dummy 
    Other services (1,0) industry dummy 
Regions of the UK  
    Greater London (1,0) regional dummy 
    Rest of South  (1,0) regional dummy 
    East Anglia (1,0) regional dummy 
    South West (1,0) regional dummy 
    West Midlands (1,0) regional dummy 
    East Midlands (1,0) regional dummy 
    Yorkshire (1,0) regional dummy 
    North West (1,0) regional dummy 
    North (1,0) regional dummy 
    Wales (1,0) regional dummy 
    Scotland (1,0) regional dummy 
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Table A4: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Males Females 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent Variable:     
    Log of real hourly wage 1.737 0.482 1.464 0.464 
Independent Variables:     
    Age 37.13 11.54 37.09 10.86 
Race     
    White (reference) 0.967 0.180 0.968 0.177 
    Black 0.008 0.091 0.012 0.108 
    Other non-white 0.025 0.157 0.020 0.142 
Marital Status     
    Never Married (reference) 0.231 0.421 0.176 0.381 
    Married or Living as a Couple  0.721 0.448 0.724 0.447 
    Widowed/Separated/Divorced 0.048 0.214 0.010 0.300 
Highest Qualification     
    Higher or First Degree, Teaching 0.164 0.370 0.152 0.359 
    Other Higher Education  0.244 0.429 0.154 0.361 
    GCE A-level 0.148 0.355 0.116 0.320 
    GCE O-level (reference) 0.202 0.402 0.269 0.444 
    CSE Grade1-5 0.055 0.228 0.041 0.198 
    Apprenticeship, Nursing, Other  0.037 0.188 0.099 0.298 
    No Qualification 0.150 0.357 0.169 0.375 
Health     
    Registered Disabled 0.010 0.099 0.007 0.083 
    Limits types of work 0.063 0.243 0.082 0.274 
Other Personal Controls     
    Head of Household 0.773 0.419 0.219 0.414 
    Own Children  0.354 0.478 0.366 0.482 
    Children aged 0-4 Years  0.145 0.352 0.102 0.302 
    Children aged 5-11 Years 0.190 0.393 0.204 0.403 
    Children aged 12-15 Years 0.115 0.320 0.151 0.358 
    Unemployed in Past Year 0.070 0.255 0.047 0.212 
    Non-Participant in Past Year 0.035 0.185 0.084 0.277 
Size of Establishment     
    <10 Employees (reference) 0.142 0.349 0.198 0.400 
    10-24 Employees 0.138 0.345 0.184 0.387 
    25-49 Employees 0.134 0.341 0.160 0.366 
    50-99 Employees 0.128 0.334 0.108 0.309 
    100-199 Employees 0.118 0.323 0.098 0.296 
    200-499 Employees 0.154 0.361 0.111 0.311 
    500-999 Employees 0.080 0.271 0.054 0.229 
    >1000 Employees 0.106 0.308 0.087 0.285 
Workplace and Other Controls     
    Full-time 0.973 0.161 0.656 0.475 
    Seasonal or Temporary Work 0.025 0.156 0.043 0.203 
    Fixed time or Contract Work 0.030 0.171 0.032 0.177 
    Promotion Opportunities  0.562 0.496 0.445 0.497 
    Bonuses or Profit 0.370 0.483 0.229 0.420 
    Annual Increments 0.433 0.496 0.484 0.500 
    Union or Staff Association 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
    Member of Union 0.348 0.476 0.304 0.460 
    Rotating Shifts 0.133 0.340 0.072 0.259 
    Manager 0.242 0.428 0.140 0.347 
    Supervisor 0.179 0.383 0.166 0.372 
    Travel ≥45 Minutes 0.156 0.363 0.107 0.309 




Employing Organisation     
    Private (reference) 0.773 0.419 0.612 0.487 
    Civil Service 0.048 0.215 0.039 0.194 
    Local Govt. 0.092 0.289 0.186 0.389 
    NHS or Hospital 0.035 0.184 0.108 0.311 
    Nationalised Industry 0.021 0.143 0.004 0.059 
    Non-profit organisation 0.017 0.131 0.038 0.190 
    Armed Forces 0.008 0.089 0.001 0.030 
    Other 0.006 0.076 0.012 0.110 
Occupation Major Groups     
    Managers and Administrators 0.168 0.374 0.087 0.283 
    Professional Occupations 0.106 0.307 0.097 0.296 
    Associate Professionals and Tech 0.102 0.302 0.113 0.316 
    Clerical and Secretarial (female reference) 0.099 0.299 0.300 0.458 
    Craft and Related (male reference) 0.191 0.393 0.027 0.162 
    Personal and Protective Services 0.067 0.250 0.148 0.355 
    Sales 0.045 0.208 0.099 0.299 
    Plant and Machine Operatives 0.156 0.363 0.045 0.207 
    Other Occupations 0.066 0.248 0.084 0.278 
1-digit industry groups     
    Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.016 0.125 0.006 0.076 
    Energy and water supplies 0.032 0.176 0.008 0.087 
    Minerals, metal manufacture and chemicals 0.051 0.220 0.018 0.131 
    Metal goods, engineering and vehicles 0.153 0.360 0.045 0.207 
    Other manufacturing 0.125 0.330 0.073 0.261 
    Construction 0.054 0.225 0.007 0.082 
    Distribution, hotels and catering 0.154 0.361 0.223 0.416 
    Transport and communication 0.088 0.283 0.034 0.181 
    Banking, finance, insurance and business services 0.124 0.330 0.133 0.340 
    Other services (reference) 0.203 0.402 0.453 0.498 
Regions of the UK     
    Greater London 0.096 0.295 0.105 0.307 
    Rest of South (reference) 0.195 0.396 0.201 0.401 
    East Anglia 0.039 0.194 0.036 0.185 
    South West 0.094 0.292 0.083 0.276 
    West Midlands 0.091 0.288 0.089 0.285 
    East Midlands 0.086 0.280 0.079 0.271 
    Yorkshire 0.094 0.292 0.093 0.290 
    North West 0.104 0.306 0.103 0.304 
    North 0.067 0.249 0.064 0.245 
    Wales 0.049 0.217 0.046 0.209 
    Scotland 0.085 0.278 0.101 0.301 




Table A5: Earnings Equations using BHPS 1991-1998 
 
 Males Females 
Dependent Variable: log real hourly wage Table 2 Column 1 
Table 3 
Column 1 
     Unemployment -0.019 (3.43)† -0.009 (1.61) 
     Log of Regional to National Price Deflator 0.117 (0.69) -0.065 (0.37) 
Personal Controls     
     Males Age 16-24        Females Age 16-24 0.111 (0.83) 0.191 (0.82) 
 Age 24-29  Age 24-29 0.078 (0.58) 0.145 (0.63) 
 Age 29-34  Age 29-34 0.065 (0.49) 0.138 (0.59) 
 Age 34-39  Age 34-39 0.051 (0.39) 0.129 (0.56) 
 Age 39-44  Age 39-45 0.049 (0.37) 0.133 (0.57) 
 Age 44-51  Age 45-50 0.046 (0.35) 0.126 (0.54) 
 Age 51-64  Age 50-59 0.032 (0.24) 0.127 (0.55) 
     Married or Living as a Couple 0.002 (0.17) 0.030 (2.49)* 
     Widowed, Separated or Divorced -0.022 (1.15) 0.022 (1.24) 
     Higher or First Degree, Teaching 0.096 (3.15)† 0.119 (3.92)† 
     Other Higher Education  0.038 (2.30) 0.037 (2.28)* 
     GCE A-level 0.054 (2.82)† 0.037 (1.78) 
     CSE Grade1-5 -0.038 (1.09) 0.033 (0.80) 
     Apprenticeship, Nursing, Other 0.087 (1.63) 0.036 (1.48) 
     Other Qualification 0.045 (1.58) 0.013 (0.47) 
     Registered Disabled -0.007 (0.22) -0.069 (1.65) 
     Health Limits types of work -0.031 (3.12)† -0.035 (3.84)† 
     Head of Household -0.001 (0.03) 0.012 (1.32) 
     Own Children  -0.007 (0.63) 0.015 (1.19) 
     Children aged 0-4 Years  0.009 (0.99) -0.033 (3.13)† 
     Children aged 5-11 Years 0.014 (1.67)* -0.028 (3.00)† 
     Children aged 12-15 Years 0.011 (1.07) -0.014 (1.45) 
     Unemployed in past year -0.041 (4.76)† -0.019 (1.91) 
     Non-participant in past year -0.074 (5.83)† -0.056 (6.89)† 
Workplace Controls     
     10-24 Employees 0.032 (3.59)† 0.035 (4.33)† 
     25-49 Employees 0.032 (3.42)† 0.056 (6.31)† 
     50-99 Employees 0.052 (5.29)† 0.068 (6.74)† 
     100-199 Employees 0.052 (5.12)† 0.065 (6.23)† 
     200-499 Employees 0.071 (7.07)† 0.069 (6.50)† 
     500-999 Employees 0.081 (6.94)† 0.068 (5.46)† 
     >1000 Employees 0.094 (7.99)† 0.069 (5.56)† 
     Full-time Employment -0.154 (9.44)† -0.101 (13.58)† 
     Seasonal/Temporary Work -0.072 (4.62)† -0.027 (2.27)** 
     Contract Work -0.020 (1.54) 0.006 (0.43) 
     Promotion Opportunities 0.003 (0.51) 0.006 (1.04) 
     Bonuses or Profit  0.032 (6.38)† 0.026 (4.19)† 
     Annual Increments  0.012 (2.45)† 0.016 (3.01)† 
     Union or Staff Association 0.017 (2.09)** 0.058 (6.85)† 
     Member of Union 0.080 (8.57)† 0.035 (3.93)† 
     Rotating Shifts 0.027 (2.97)† 0.009 (0.80) 
     Manager 0.040 (4.71)† 0.038 (4.08)† 
     Supervisor 0.023 (3.66)† 0.029 (4.48)† 




Employing Organisation     
    Civil Service  0.013 (0.70) 0.044 (2.04)** 
    Local Govt. 0.037 (2.08)** 0.055 (4.14)† 
    NHS or Hospital  -0.034 (1.44) 0.030 (2.00)** 
    Nationalised Industry  0.047 (2.55)** 0.057 (1.47) 
    Non-profit organisation  -0.022 (0.92) 0.022 (1.32) 
    Armed Forces  0.096 (2.59)† 0.083 (1.16) 
    Other  -0.068 (2.33)** 0.035 (1.42) 
Occupation Major Groups     
     Managers and Administrators 0.015 (1.24) 0.026 (2.24)** 
     Professional Occupations 0.026 (1.91)* 0.051 (3.23)† 
     Associate Professionals and Technical 0.014 (1.12) 0.051 (4.14)† 
     Clerical and Secretarial -0.031 (2.59)† - - 
     Craft and Related  - - -0.051 (2.16)* 
     Personal and Protective Services -0.076 (4.62)† -0.070 (5.61)† 
     Sales -0.018 (1.18) -0.095 (7.92)† 
     Plant and Machine Operatives -0.033 (3.22)† -0.029 (1.51) 
     Other Occupations -0.080 (5.72)† -0.098 (6.47)† 
Industry Classes (1-digit)     
     Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.019 (0.65) -0.003 (0.08) 
     Energy and water supplies 0.076 (3.20)† 0.157 (4.50)† 
     Minerals, metal manufacture and chemicals 0.031 (1.66)* 0.032 (1.23) 
     Metal goods, engineering and vehicles 0.016 (1.07) 0.088 (4.77)† 
     Other manufacturing 0.026 (1.72)* -0.001 (0.09) 
     Construction 0.016 (0.94) 0.093 (2.82)† 
     Distribution, hotels and catering -0.031 (2.17)** -0.030 (2.71)† 
     Transport and communication -0.001 (0.01) -0.017 (0.84) 
     Banking, finance, insurance and business services 0.038 (2.68)† 0.032 (2.51)** 
Region Dummies     
    Greater London 0.079 (2.38)** 0.048 (1.55) 
    East Anglia -0.018 (0.42) 0.005 (0.09) 
    South West 0.027 (0.71) -0.108 (2.93)† 
    West Midlands -0.037 (0.84) -0.134 (3.12)† 
    East Midlands 0.012 (0.32) -0.023 (0.55) 
    Yorkshire -0.022 (0.43) 0.001 (0.01) 
    North West -0.031 (0.69) 0.020 (0.41) 
    North 0.001 (0.01) 0.077 (1.18) 
    Wales 0.088 (1.71)* -0.203 (3.00)† 
    Scotland 0.024 (0.43) -0.022 (0.44) 
Time Dummies     
     Wave 2 -0.002 (0.02) -0.092 (0.40) 
     Wave 3 -0.048 (0.18) -0.213 (0.46) 
     Wave 4 -0.111 (0.28) -0.348 (0.50) 
     Wave 5 -0.185 (0.35) -0.471 (0.51) 
     Wave 6 -0.229 (0.34) -0.596 (0.51) 
     Wave 7 -0.300 (0.38) -0.737 (0.53) 
     Wave 8 -0.337 (0.36) -0.850 (0.52) 
Constant -1.949 (0.43) -4.161 (0.53) 
Diagnostics   
F 30.94 [0.000] 27.55 [0.000] 
R2 0.9323 0.9189 
NT 17,080 17,421 
 
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  Significance levels: †(0.01), **(0.05), *(0.10); p-values in [ ] 
